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This is a study of the security of the Coherent One-Way (COW) protocol for quantum cryp-
tography, proposed recently as a simple and fast experimental scheme. In the zero-error regime,
the eavesdropper Eve can only take advantage of the losses in the transmission. We consider new
attacks, based on unambiguous state discrimination, which perform better than the basic beam-
splitting attack, but which can be detected by a careful analysis of the detection statistics. These
results stress the importance of testing several statistical parameters in order to achieve higher rates
of secret bits.
I. INTRODUCTION
First proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84
protocol, [1]), quantum cryptography has attracted a lot
of attention, as means of realizing a useful task (key dis-
tribution for secret communication) based on the super-
position principle of quantum physics. One of the fea-
tures, that makes quantum cryptography appealing, is
the possibility of implementing it with present-day tech-
nology. After several years devoted to more and more
elaborated realizations of the BB84 protocol [2], people
gained in confidence, and started devising new proto-
cols that are tailored for practical implementations. A
new class of such protocols are distributed phase refer-
ence schemes [3–5], where the signals have overall phase-
relationships to each other which is expected to protect
against some loss-related attacks, such as the photon-
number splitting attack, in a similar way as the strong
phase reference in the original Bennett 1992 (B92) pro-
tocol [6] does. These new protocols are providing new
challenges for theorists, as we can no longer identify in-
dividual signals, and so the usual security proof tech-
niques do not apply. It is important to understand how
we prove the security, and the context of the present work
is to show limitations of secure rates by showing specific
attacks that can be performed by an eavesdropper.
In a protocol like BB84, each bit is coded in a qubit:
Alice prepares a photon in a given state which codes (say)
for 0 and sends it to Bob; then, she prepares another pho-
ton in another state which codes (say) for 1, and sends
it, and so on. In short, each quantum signal codes for
one bit. For this kind of protocols, powerful security
proofs have been derived for the case where the quantum
signal is a single photon [7–9] or a weak coherent pulse
[10,11]. But one can also code a bit in the relative phase
between any two successive coherent pulses: in such a
protocol (called differential phase shift) the first bit is in
the phase between pulse one and pulse two, the second
bit in the phase between pulse two and pulse three, and
so on [3]. Thus, each pulse participates to the coding of
two bits and is coherent with all the other pulses: there
is a unique quantum signal, the string of all the pulses,
which codes for the whole string of bits.
The search for security bounds for such schemes is an
important research activity in theoretical quantum cryp-
tography. In this paper, we study a protocol of the same
kind called Coherent One-Way (COW) [4,5], which will
be explained in detail later. We present new attacks on
this protocol based on unambiguous state discrimination.
These attacks take advantage of the fact that, on the one
hand, the coding of COWmakes use of empty pulses and,
on the other hand, coherence is checked only between suc-
cessive pulses: in particular then, no coherence is checked
between all that comes before and all that comes after an
empty pulse. Therefore, if Eve can be sure that a given
pulse was empty, she can make an attack that breaks no
observed coherence. The attacks that we have found do
not introduce any errors in the statistical parameters that
are usually checked, the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
and the visibility of an interferometer; but they do intro-
duce modifications in other statistical parameters, which
Alice and Bob could check as well. The main message of
this paper is that the COW protocol should include ad-
ditional statistical checks. Of course, since we describe
specific attacks, in this paper we derive only upper bounds
for security (i.e., more powerful attacks may exist).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we re-
call the definition of the COW protocol and introduce our
working assumptions. Section III presents unambiguous
state discrimination (USD) strategies on three and four
successive pulses, and the detection rates for the COW
protocol that Bob would observe if Eve applied those
strategies. In Section IV, we present our main results:
an attack that combines three USD strategies and that
preserves all the observed detection rates in Bob’s de-
tectors. Section V is a conclusion. In the Appendices,
we provide the security study for a three-state protocol
that is the analog of the COW protocol if the coherence
between bits would be broken (Appendix A) and for the
beam-splitting attack considered as a collective attack
(Appendix B); we also present the detailed calculations
for the best attack that we have found (Appendix C)
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and an attack that becomes possible if Alice and Bob
would make a too limited statistical analysis (Appendix
D); finally, we suggest a feasible modification of the COW
protocol that would improve its security (Appendix E).
II. THE COW PROTOCOL
A. The protocol
The idea of the COW protocol is to have a very simple
data line in which the raw key is created, protected by
the observation of quantum interferences in a monitoring
line. We review here its features, referring to Refs [4,5]
for a more comprehensive discussion of motivations and
practical issues. The protocol is schematized in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1. Schematic description of the COW protocol. A
continuous, phase-stabilized coherent laser beam is sent
through an intensity modulator (IM) that shapes discrete
pulses, while preserving the coherence. See text for all other
details.
Alice produces a train of equally spaced coherent
pulses. The logical bit 0 is encoded in the sequence
|0〉2k|α〉2k−1 of a non-empty pulse at time t2k−1 followed
by an empty one at time t2k; the logical bit 1 in the oppo-
site sequence |α〉2k|0〉2k−1. We write µ = |α|2 the mean
photon number in a non-empty pulse. Alice produces
each bit value with probability 1−f2 ; with probability
f , she sends out the decoy sequence |d〉 = |α〉2k|α〉2k−1,
which does not encode any bit value. The coherence time
of Alice’s laser is very large, so that the quantum signal
cannot be divided bitwise, because there is phase coher-
ence between any two non-empty pulses. In other words,
there is a single quantum signal, defined by Alice’s list,
e.g.
|”...0d01...”〉 = |... : 0α : αα : 0α : α0 : ...〉 (1)
(from now on, the colon represents the bit separation).
The coherence across different bits is crucial to this
scheme — a protocol that uses the same coding of bits,
but in which there is no distributed coherence, is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
Alice and Bob are connected by a quantum channel of
length ℓ, whose transmission coefficient is t = 10−αattℓ/10;
the parameters αatt, whose units are dB/km, is called at-
tenuation coefficient.
Bob’s detection is completely passive. At the entrance
of Bob’s device, an asymmetric coupler sends a fraction
tB of the photons into the data line, and the remaining
fraction 1 − tB into the monitoring line. The data line
consists of a single photon counter DB: the logical bits 0
and 1 are discriminated by measuring the time of arrival
(this gives indeed the best unambiguous state discrimi-
nation between the states |0〉|α〉 and |α〉|0〉). The errors
on the data line give the quantum bit error rate (QBER,
Q). The monitoring line contains a stabilized unbalanced
interferometer and two photon counters DM1, DM2. In
the interferometer, the delayed half of each pulse is re-
combined by the non-delayed half of the next pulse: if the
two pulses were non-empty, the interference is arranged
in such a way that DM2 should never click. The cases
where two successive pulses are non empty are (i) the
decoy sequences, in which case the coherence is within
the bit separation, and (ii) a logical bit 1 followed by a
logical bit 0, in which case the coherence is across the bit
separation. In each of these cases separately (s = d or
s = 1−0), Alice and Bob can estimate the errors through
the visibility Vs =
p(DM1|s)−p(DM2|s)
p(DM1|s)+p(DM2|s) where p(D|s) is the
probability that detector D has fired at a time corre-
sponding to a s sequence.
For the estimation of the visibilities and of the count-
ing statistics, Bob announces (i) in which two-pulse se-
quence he had a detection in the data line, and (ii) at
which times he had a detection in DM1 and DM2. Alice
tells Bob which items of the data line must be discarded
because they correspond to decoy sequences; on her side,
she estimates Vd and V10 and the counting statistics. Fi-
nally, Q is estimated as usual by Bob revealing some of
the bits of the data line.
The amount of information gathered by Eve is esti-
mated through Q, Vd, V10, but not only: the monitoring
of other statistical quantities may provide much better
estimates. Specifically, it is important to monitor detec-
tion rates, as we show in this paper. Finer checks could
involve the monitoring of the frequency of each bit value
and of many-bit strings, the rate at which any two or all
three detectors fire, etc.
B. Detection statistics in the zero-error case
In this work, we consider only attacks that introduce
no errors in the state parameters of the coding (Q = 0,
V = 1), and that can therefore be detected only by look-
ing at the statistics of the photon counters. Among the
statistical parameters, we focus on detection rates. We
suppose that all three Bob’s detectors have the same
quantum efficiency η and no dark counts. We also work
in the trusted-device scenario, i.e. the inefficiency of the
detector is not given to Eve. Under these assumptions,
the expected detection rates are the following:
• In detector DB, one can estimate the detections
due to ”bits” and those due to ”decoy sequences”
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(detection rate per two time-slots):
DtB,bit = (1− f)(1− e−µ t tBη) , (2)
DtB,decoy = 2 f (1− e−µ t tBη) ; (3)
of course, the total detection rate in this detector
is
DtB = D
t
B,bit +D
t
B,decoy . (4)
• In detectors DM1 and DM2, one can estimate two
different detection rates. (i) The detection rates
at time t2k correspond to interference between two
pulses within a bit sequence. The logical bits pro-
duce random outcomes, while the decoy sequences
interfere constructively in DM1 (recall V = 1):
DtM1,2k = (1− f)Drand + fDint , (5)
DtM2,2k = (1− f)Drand (6)
where Drand = 1 − e−µt(1−tB)η/4 and Dint =
1 − e−µt(1−tB)η. (ii) The detection rates at time
t2k+1 correspond to interference between two pulses
across the bit separation. Constructive interference
appears in DM1 in the cases 1− 0, 1− d, d− 0 and
d− d, i.e. with probability (1 + f)2/4; in the case
0 − 1 there is no photon, so no detection, in the
other cases the outcome is random:
DtM1,2k+1 =
1− f2
2
Drand +
(1 + f)2
4
Dint , (7)
DtM2,2k+1 =
1− f2
2
Drand . (8)
Now, since tB has been calibrated by Bob, these six de-
tection rates depend only on two parameters, namely f
and x ≡ e−µtη. Bob can verify that the observed de-
tection rates are consistent in themselves, and with the
expected values of f and x.
About other statistical quantities that can be checked
by Alice and Bob: in the attacks that we consider below,
the coincidence rates are not really a concern, the bit
values are equally probable; but the many-bit statistics
are somehow biased and may reveal the attacks.
C. Zero-error attacks
In the ideal situation that we consider (zero-error, i.e.
Q = 0, V = 1), the eavesdropper can take advantage
only of the losses in the channel, whose transmission is t.
Here we characterize the full set of attacks that Eve can
have performed, if Alice and Bob observe zero errors.
The simplest attack is beam-splitting (BS) attack: Eve
simulates the lossy channel by extracting the (1− t) frac-
tion of the signal with a beam-splitter, and sends the
expected fraction t to Bob on a lossless line. Since a
beam-splitter is strictly equivalent to losses, this attack
is always possible and is impossible to detect by monitor-
ing the data of Alice and Bob. Thus, this attack sets an
obvious upper bound on the achievable secret key rate.
We analyze it in detail in Appendix B, improving over
the study of Ref. [5]. Though it is unavoidable, the BS
attack is not very powerful: it would be a very good point
for a protocol, if it could be shown that this attack is the
only possible one in the absence of errors.
The BS attack is an example of attacks that preserve
the mode, while possibly changing the statistics of the
photon numbers; these attacks always belong to the
class of zero-error attacks. In distributed phase reference
schemes, each photon belongs to an extended mode that
encodes the coherence. Specifically, in the case of dif-
ferential phase shift, the mode is A† = 1√
N
∑N
j=1 e
iϕj a†j
where a†j creates a photon in the j-th pulse [12]. In the
case of COW, the extended mode is
A† ∝
N∑
k=1
a†k,sk (9)
where sk ∈ {0, 1, d} defines the nature of the k-th two-
pulse sequence, and the creation operators are a†k,0 =
a†2k−1, a
†
k,1 = a
†
2k and a
†
k,d = a
†
2k−1 + a
†
2k.
The attacks that preserve the extended mode would
be the only zero-error attacks if Alice and Bob would
check all the coherence relations. In the case of COW
however, Alice and Bob check the coherence only on two
successive pulses: in particular, no coherence is checked
between all that comes before and all that comes after an
empty pulse. Therefore, if Eve can be sure that a given
pulse was empty, she can make an attack that breaks the
coherence at the location of that pulse. More generally,
Eve can try and distinguish a sequence of n pulses that
begins and ends with an empty pulse: if she succeeds, she
can then resend photons belonging to this n-slots mode
(”partial mode”). All these attacks must use unambigu-
ous state discrimination (USD). In this paper we study
examples of such attacks.
The list of zero-error attacks is now complete. To see
it, we note that any photon received from Bob is either
one of the photons originally sent by Alice (which then
belongs to the original extended mode), or a new pho-
ton created by Eve (in which case she must have known
exactly in which partial mode to send it). In particular,
the photon-number splitting (PNS) attack [13] is never
a zero-error attack for the schemes under study [5,14]:
since any two non-empty pulses are coherent, any at-
tempt of measuring the number of photons on a finite
number of pulses breaks some coherence and contributes
to errors.
3
III. UNAMBIGUOUS STATE DISCRIMINATION
ON THREE AND FOUR PULSES
A. Generalities
The attacks that we study are based on unambiguous
state discrimination (USD). Suppose the set of possible
states is known (cryptography is a natural example [15]):
the unambiguous discrimination of any state |ψ〉 in the
set is possible if and only if this state is linearly inde-
pendent from all the other states in the set [16]. For the
present study, we just need to identify one state |ψ〉 in
the set; therefore, we consider measurements with only
two outcomes: the unambiguous identification and the
inconclusive outcome [17]. In this case, the optimal USD
strategy is as follows: in the subspace formed by the
states of the set, one selects |φ〉 as the state orthogonal
to all but |ψ〉, and performs the von Neumann measure-
ment
{
Pc = |φ〉〈φ|, P⊥ = 1 − Pc
}
. If the state was not
|ψ〉, the result is certainly ⊥; so if the result is c, the state
was certainly |ψ〉. Given that the state is |ψ〉, the con-
clusive result c happens with probability pc = |〈ψ|φ〉|2.
Specifically, Eve wants to discriminate a given finite
sequence of pulses from all the other possible ones; the
chosen sequence must be such that the first pulse and the
last one are empty. When the result is conclusive, she can
prepare and forward the same sequence to Bob; when the
result is inconclusive, we suppose that she blocks every-
thing (finer strategies are possible, but we neglect them
[18]). By definition, such an attack leaves Q = 0 and
V = 1, because Bob receives something only when Eve
is sure to forward the same sequence as Alice sent, and
because no observable coherence has been broken thanks
to the empty pulses [19]. However, Eve introduces losses,
because the conclusive result is only probabilistic; and,
according to the state she actually discriminates and for-
wards, Bob’s statistics are also modified.
Our goal in what follows is to quantify the amount of
information that Eve obtains and to analyze how Bob’s
statistics are affected, for some examples of USD at-
tacks on the COW protocol. Specifically, we are going
to present three USD attacks. These three attacks can
be alternated with one another without introducing er-
rors. Eve can also avoid errors by stopping the USD
attacks after a successful discrimination. However, she
cannot avoid the risk of errors if she resumes the attack
again. What she can do, is to attack large blocks, then
to stop also for a large block, then resume and so on: this
way, the events in which Eve risks introducing an error
have almost zero statistical weight (in particular, they
can be overwhelmed by dark counts and other imperfec-
tions, which are neglected here).
B. USD3: Attack on Three Pulses
The USD3 attack is defined as follows: Eve takes three
pulses that come from Alice and wants to discriminate
unambiguously the sequence |0α0〉 from the other possi-
ble three-pulses sequences. When the discrimination is
successful, she forwards some photons (not necessarily a
coherent state) in the central time-slot; when the result
is not conclusive, she doesn’t forward anything. One can
see immediately that this attack doesn’t introduce any
errors in the data line, preserves the randomness of the
bit value, and doesn’t make detector DM2 of Bob’s moni-
toring line click when it shouldn’t. The limitation of this
attack is that Eve never forwards anything when Alice
had sent two successive non empty pulses; so, if this at-
tacks is performed systematically, Alice and Bob notice
that no decoy sequences have been detected, nor do they
have any data to estimate V .
1. Discriminating |0α0〉
Eve wants to discriminate the state |0α0〉 from the
other possible states, which are the following:
|00α〉 , |0αα〉 , |α00〉 , |α0α〉 , |αα0〉 , |ααα〉 . (10)
Note that the sequence |000〉 is never sent by Alice. More-
over, the sequences |00α〉 and |α00〉 can be sent only if
the bit separation is between the two empty pulses; given
that Eve knows the position of the separation, she there-
fore has only to discriminate between |0α0〉 and five other
states.
For each case, the six possible states are linearly in-
dependent. As a consequence, there is a state in this
6-dimensional subspace which is orthogonal to the five
other possible states: this state is (in both cases)
|ψ0α0〉 = 1
1− χ2 (|0α0〉 − χ|0αα〉 − χ|αα0〉+ χ
2|ααα〉) (11)
where χ = 〈0|α〉 = e−|α|2/2 = e−µ/2. Eve performs a
projective measurement which separates |ψ0α0〉 from the
subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned on the fact that
the state |0α0〉 was sent by Alice, the probability of a con-
clusive result is |〈0α0|ψ0α0〉|2 = (1 − χ2)2 = (1− e−µ)2.
2. Detection rates in COW for USD3
Let us compute the detection rates in Bob’s detectors
when Eve performs the USD3 attack. Eve forwards some-
thing to Bob with probability
p0α0concl =
(
1− f
2
)2
(1 − e−µ)2 . (12)
We denote by Π(p) = 1 − 〈(1 − p)n〉E the average de-
tection probability of the state |E〉 that Eve forwards, as
4
a function of the single-photon probability detection p.
In particular, Π(p) = p if Eve forwards a single photon,
Π(p) ≈ 1 if she forwards a bright pulse. The detection
rates on the detector DB are
D
(3)
B,bit =
2
3
p0α0conclΠ(tBη) , (13)
D
(3)
B,decoy = 0 . (14)
The factor 23 comes from the fact that we compute the
detection rate per bit, i.e. for two time slots, while the at-
tack was performed on three pulses. The detection rates
on the monitoring line are just random clicks, since two
successive pulses are never sent, and so we find
D
(3)
M1,2k = D
(3)
M2,2k = D
(3)
M1,2k+1 = D
(3)
M2,2k+1
=
2
3
p0α0conclΠ
(
(1 − tB)η
4
)
, (15)
where the factor 14 in the transmission probability comes
from the fact that each photon has the ”choice” between
two paths in the interferometer, and the ”choice” between
two detectors.
C. USD4a: A First Attack on Four Pulses
The USD4a attack is defined as follows: Eve takes four
pulses coming from Alice that correspond to two bits, and
she wants to discriminate the sequence |0α : α0〉 from the
other possible sequences. As before, when Eve success-
fully could discriminate this sequence, she forwards pho-
tons in the two middle time slots, making sure they will
interfere correctly in Bob’s monitoring line, while when
she couldn’t discriminate this sequence she doesn’t for-
ward anything.
Again, this attack doesn’t introduce any bit error, and
doesn’t make the detector DM2 click when it shouldn’t.
Contrary to USD3, V can be estimated, but only from
1 − 0 bit sequences: no decoy sequences are ever for-
warded.
1. Discriminating |0α : α0〉
Eve wants to discriminate the sequence |0α : α0〉 from
the other possible following states that Alice could send:
|0α : 0α〉, |0α : αα〉, |α0 : 0α〉, |α0 : α0〉,
|α0 : αα〉, |αα : 0α〉, |αα : α0〉, |αα : αα〉. (16)
In the subspace defined by the nine possible states, the
state which is orthogonal to the eight states listed in (16)
is
|ψ0α:α0〉 = 11−χ2 (|0α : α0〉 − χ|0α : αα〉
−χ|αα : α0〉+ χ2|αα : αα〉) . (17)
Eve performs a projective measurement which separates
|ψ0α:α0〉 from the subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned
on the fact that the state |0α : α0〉 was sent by Alice, the
probability of a conclusive result is |〈0α : α0|ψ0α:α0〉|2 =
(1−χ2)2. This is the same probability as obtained before,
in the discrimination of three-pulse state |0α0〉.
2. Detection rates in COW for USD4a
Let us compute the detection rates in Bob’s detectors
when Eve performs the USD4a attack. Eve forwards
something to Bob with probability p0α:α0concl which, as we
just stressed, is given by (12). The detection rates on the
detector DB are
D
(4a)
B,bit =
1
2
p0α:α0concl Π(tBη) , (18)
D
(4a)
B,decoy = 0 . (19)
The factor 12 comes from the fact that we compute the
detection rate per bit, i.e. for two time slots, while the
attack was performed on 4 pulses. We have also assumed
that Bob’s detectors have no dead time [20].
The detection rates on the monitoring lines behave dif-
ferently, according to the time. The detections at times
t2k are just random, since there are no decoy sequences
and consequently no interference between pulses within
a bit sequence:
D
(4a)
M1,2k = D
(4a)
M2,2k =
1
2
p0α:α0concl Π
(
(1 − tB)η
4
)
. (20)
On the contrary, when Eve forwards something, there is
always a coherence across the bit separation; therefore
the detections at times t2k+1 exhibit full interference ef-
fects:
D
(4a)
M1,2k+1 =
1
2
p0α:α0concl Π
(
(1− tB)η
2
)
(21)
D
(4a)
M2,2k+1 = 0 . (22)
D. USD4b: A Second Attack on Four Pulses
The two attacks USD3 and USD4a share the same fea-
ture, namely, that no decoy sequences ever reach Bob. In
order to pass as much unnoticed as possible, Eve could
be obliged to alternate those attacks with another one,
in which decoy sequences are sent. We consider the sim-
plest one, in which Eve wants to discriminate |0 : αα : 0〉
from the other possible sequences. Again, the colon rep-
resents the bit separation: contrary to USD4a, now the
four pulses are across three bit sequences.
One realizes immediately that this is a curious attack:
if performed systematically, Eve would forward only de-
coy sequences, so no raw key would be created! As we
said, it is interesting to consider it only as a part of a
more complex attack, in which Eve would alternate it
with the attacks we have already presented.
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1. Discriminating |0 : αα : 0〉
One might expect that the probability of conclusive re-
sult is the same as before. But this is not the case: there
are now more possible sequences, across the 3 bits, that
Alice could send. Specifically, Eve wants to discriminate
the sequence |0 : αα : 0〉 from the following eleven states:
|0 : 0α : 0〉, |0 : α0 : 0〉,
|0 : 0α : α〉, |0 : α0 : α〉, |0 : αα : α〉,
|α : 0α : 0〉, |α : α0 : 0〉, |α : αα : 0〉,
|α : 0α : α〉, |α : α0 : α〉, |α : αα : α〉.
(23)
The state orthogonal to these eleven states is
|ψ0:αα:0〉 = (1 + χ
2)φ(αα) − χ [φ(0α) + φ(α0)]√
1− χ4 (24)
where we have written
φ(X) =
|0X0〉 − χ|0Xα〉 − χ|αX0〉+ χ2|αXα〉
1− χ2 . (25)
Conditioned on the fact that the state |0 : αα : 0〉 was
sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is
|〈0 : αα : 0|ψ0:αα:0〉|2 = (1−χ
2)3
1+χ2 . Note that this is much
smaller than the value (1−χ2)2 obtained in the previous
examples: specifically, for µ ≪ 1, it goes as 12µ3 (three
photons) instead of µ2 (two photons).
2. Detection rates in COW for USD4b
Eve forwards something to Bob with probability
p0:αα:0concl = f
(
1− f
2
)2
(1− e−µ)3
1 + e−µ
. (26)
The detection rates on the detector DB are
D
(4b)
B,bit = 0 , (27)
D
(4b)
B,decoy =
1
2
p0:αα:0concl Π(tBη) (28)
with the same factor 12 as discussed for the USD4a at-
tack. Detections in the monitoring line behave just the
opposite way as they did for the USD4a attack:
D
(4b)
M1,2k =
1
2
p0:αα:0concl Π
(
(1 − tB)η
2
)
, (29)
D
(4b)
M2,2k = 0 ; (30)
D
(4b)
M1,2k+1 = D
(4b)
M2,2k+1 =
1
2
p0:αα:0concl Π
(
(1− tB)η
4
)
. (31)
In summary, there is an obvious symmetry between the
USD4a and USD4b attacks. However, the fact that
p0:αα:0concl < p
0α:α0
concl introduces an important difference. In
fact, the need for sending some decoy sequences is very
costly for Eve: she has to perform sometimes a very in-
efficient attack, which moreover gives her no information
on the key (she knows that the decoy sequence was pre-
ceded by a bit 1 and followed by a bit 0, but she does
not send anything to Bob apart from the decoy sequence
itself, so these two bits cannot be detected).
IV. COMBINING THE THREE USD ATTACKS
In the previous Section, we have described an at-
tack where Eve forwards ”bits” (USD3), an attack
where she forwards ”coherence across the bit separa-
tion” (USD4a), and an attack which forwards ”decoy se-
quences” (USD4b). These are zero-error attacks as far as
the state parameters are concerned (Q = 0, V = 1), but
each one taken separately introduces deviations from the
expected detection rates. Here we show that, provided
f <∼ 0.236, Eve can alternate among the three attacks in
order to simulate all the expected detection rates.
A. Definition of the attack
The attack that we consider (with no claim of optimal-
ity) is constructed as follows. Eve performs USD3 with
probability q1, USD4a with probability q2, and USD4b
with probability q3. With probability q0, she just for-
wards the pulses through a lossless channel (t = 1). Re-
call that Eve can alternate as she likes among the USD
attacks, but she must not stop and resume them too often
(see end of paragraph IIIA).
We suppose that this is all she does, so that
q0 + q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 . (32)
We want all detection rates to be the expected ones:
the six rates D = DB,bit, DB,decoy, DM1,2k, DM2,2k,
DM1,2k+1 or DM2,2k+1 must be such that
q0D
t=1 + q1D
(3) + q2D
(4a) + q3D
(4b) = Dt . (33)
We make two further assumptions, namely (i) that Eve
forwards always a single photon when she has got a con-
clusive result [21], in particular then Π(p) = p; and (ii)
that we can work in the limit µη ≪ 1, so that we can
linearize all the detection rates Dt. In this case, an ana-
lytical solution can be found (Appendix C), that reads
q0 =
µtF − 1
µF − 1 (34)
qj =
µ(1− t)Fj
µF − 1 (j = 1, 2, 3) (35)
where
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F1 =
3(1− 4f − f2)
4p0α0concl
=
3(1− 4f − f2)
(1− f)2
1
(1 − e−µ)2 , (36)
F2 =
(1 + f)2
p0α:α0concl
= 4
(
1 + f
1− f
)2
1
(1− e−µ)2 , (37)
F3 =
4f
p0:αα:0concl
=
16
(1− f)2
1 + e−µ
(1− e−µ)3 , (38)
F ≡ F1 + F2 + F3 = 1
(1 − f)2
32−F(1− e−µ)
(1 − e−µ)3 (39)
with F = 9+4f −f2. Note that, while F2 and F3 are al-
ways strictly positive, for F1 to be non-negative one must
have f ≤ √5 − 2 ≈ 0.236: this means that Eve cannot
reproduce the detection rates with this attack if a large
fraction of decoy sequences is used.
B. Upper Bound on the Secret Key Rate
We can now compute the secret key rate that can be
extracted by Alice and Bob in the presence of the attack
just described. We consider the case of one-way classical
post-processing, and use the Csisza`r-Ko¨rner formula [22]
R = DtB,bit [I(A : B)−min (I(A : E), I(B : E))] (40)
where H is Shannon entropy, I(X : Y ) is mutual infor-
mation, and by definition of our attacks we have
DtB,bit = q0D
t=1
B,bit + q1D
(3)
B,bit + q2D
(4a)
B,bit . (41)
The use of the Csisza`r-Ko¨rner formula can be justified
by an argument analog to the one used in Ref. [23]: the
USD attack immediately gives a decomposition of the
data into those on which Eve has full information (i.e.
those on which the USD attack has been applied and has
given conclusive result) and those on which Eve has no
information at all (i.e. those that have been sent over the
ideal channel). In this case, the Csisza`r-Ko¨rner formula
gives a tight bound if Alice and Bob were sure that Eve
is performing exactly that attack; since this is not proved
(there might be better attacks compatible with the ob-
served statistics), the value of R that we compute is an
upper bound on the secret key rate that can be extracted
with one-way post-processing.
Now, on the one hand, since there are no errors in
the state, whenever Bob detects something in DB (other
than a decoy sequence) he learns correctly Alice’s bit:
I(A : B) = 1 . (42)
This implies I(A : E) = I(B : E). On the other hand,
Eve has full information on the bits that she attacked
and forwarded and were detected in DB, and she has no
information in all the other cases:
I(A : E) =
q1D
(3)
B,bit + q2D
(4a)
B,bit
DtB,bit
. (43)
This gives the expected results, namely that Alice and
Bob have secrecy if and only if the bit was not attacked
by Eve:
R(µ) = q0D
t=1
B,bit =
µtF (µ)− 1
µF (µ)− 1 µ tBη(1 − f) . (44)
As usual, Alice and Bob choose the value of µ that max-
imizes R. Another meaningful parameter is µmax, the
critical value such that R = 0 (that is, q0 = 0: Eve
can perform her attack on all the bits). The calculation
of µopt, R(µopt) and µmax has been done numerically;
the results are shown in Fig. 2. These parameters can
also be estimated analytically in the limit µ ≪ 1, using
F (µ) ≈ 1(1−f)2 32µ3 and therefore q0 ≈ t − (1−f)
2
32 µ
2; it
yields
µopt ≈ 4
√
6
3(1− f)
√
t , (45)
R(µopt) ≈ 8
√
6
9
tBη t
3/2 , (46)
µmax ≈
√
3µopt . (47)
For long distances, these analytical estimation are in close
agreement with the numerical optimization.
In Fig. 2, our attack is compared to the Holevo bound
on the beam-splitting (BS) attack computed in Appendix
B. As we can see in the lower graph, the BS attack is
more powerful than ours for ℓ <∼ 100km; by referring to
the upper graph, we note a discontinuity in µopt. This
is due to the fact that we have not considered a mixture
between our attack and the BS attack; if we had consid-
ered it, the transition between the two would have been
smooth.
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FIG. 2. USD attack that reproduces the detection rates:
optimal mean photon number µopt (upper graph) and corre-
sponding secret key rate R (lower graph) as a function of the
Alice-Bob distance ℓ. The attack is compared to the Holevo
bound on the beam-splitting attack. Parameters: η = 0.1,
αatt = 0.25 dB/km, f = 0.1, tB ≃ 1.
C. Comments on the result
We have described a specific attack, which introduces
no errors in the state parameters, and which reproduces
all the expected detection rates as well. Let’s comment
on the results.
To the attack, as we have studied it, many limitations
can be found. First, this attack is not a real concern as
of today: in fact, it outperforms the BS attack only for
ℓ >∼ 100km (Fig. 2), which is anyway the typical limit-
ing distance when dark counts are taken into account [5].
Second, the attack is not entirely undetectable with the
actual setup: even though all the detection rates are re-
produced, one could check other statistical parameters,
which would behave in an unexpected way. For instance,
since decoy sequences are always forwarded in the form
|0 : αα : 0〉, Alice and Bob can realize that the two pulses
before a decoy sequence that they detect always encodes
a logical bit 1, and the two pulses after the decoy se-
quence always encodes a logical bit 0. Finally, as seen in
Sec. IVA, Alice and Bob could simply choose f > 0.236,
and the attack that we studied becomes impossible.
A further interesting point is that the power of the at-
tack can be further reduced by a hardware modification,
which keeps the simplicity of the experimental realiza-
tion: it simply amounts at adding empty decoy sequences.
The idea is that, by adding a new kind of signal, the con-
clusive probability of USD become smaller, because Eve
has to distinguish the desired state among a larger set.
The analysis is done in Appendix E; the intuition is con-
firmed: by adding empty decoy sequences, we obtain a
decrease R(µopt) ∝ t4/3 [Eq. (E14)] at long distances,
which is slower than R(µopt) ∝ t3/2 given in Eq. (46).
Note that other hardware modifications would help as
well, in particular adding interferometers that monitor
coherence across more than one pulse; but these would
make the experiment more complicated [24].
All these arguments can be made as an objection to the
importance of our attack. However, that precise attack is
only an example: there is no claim of optimality. There
is some room for improvement even on USD strategies
with three and four pulses [18], and we have not studied
USD attacks on more than four pulses. Another concern
is that we don’t have any estimate of the robustness of
our result when the precision of the statistical estimates
of Alice and Bob decreases. Here, we have worked with-
out dark counts and in the limit of an infinite sequence:
the presence of dark counts and the finite-size effects,
obviously present in any real experiment, may blur the
statistics. Eve’s attack may become much more serious
if she is asked to guarantee only an approximation of
the expected detection rates, or to reconstruct only a
smaller set of statistical quantities. A simple example of
what can happen if Alice and Bob do not make a careful
enough statistical estimate is given in Appendix D.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we have studied the security of the COW
protocol in the regime of zero error in the state parame-
ters (Q = 0, V = 1). In this regime, Eve can take advan-
tage only of the losses; while the beam-splitting attack is
always possible, because it preserves the collective mode
in which all photons have been encoded, we addressed
the existence of more powerful attacks.
We have indeed found examples of other zero-error at-
tacks, which however introduce some modifications in the
statistics observed by Bob. We have presented an at-
tack that preserves all the detection rates and can be
detected only by looking at correlations between two or
more bits. This attack becomes relevant only for large
distances (ℓ >∼ 100 km for typical values).
These results show that, both in the experiment and in
the theoretical search of lower bounds for security, higher
secret key rates can be achieved if the COW protocol in-
cludes several tests of Bob’s statistics. We conjecture
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that the beam-splitting attack is the only possible one in
the zero-error limit provided Alice and Bob analyze all
statistics of their data.
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APPENDIX A: THREE-STATE PROTOCOL
Here we describe a three-state protocol, that was in-
spired by the study of the COW protocol. If the coher-
ence across the bit separations in COW would be bro-
ken, the protocol could be seen as a implementation with
weak coherent pulses of a standard three-state protocol
for qubits. The qubits states thus obtained are
|+ z〉 ≡ |0〉
| − z〉 ≡ |1〉
|+ x〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) .
(A1)
Each state of the Z basis is sent with probability (1 −
f)/2; it codes a bit value, and the errors in these mea-
surements give the quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q.
The third state, belonging to the X basis, is sent with
probability f ; it allows to estimate a visibility V .
In this appendix we give a quick overview of security
studies for this protocol, relying mainly on Ref. [9], to
which we refer for the justification of the methods. An in-
dependent study of this three-state protocol has been re-
alized recently by Fung and Lo with different techniques
[25].
1. Single photon case
a. Quick review of the approach
In Ref. [9], a lower bound on the secret-key rate for a
general class of quantum key distribution protocols using
one-way classical post-processing has been derived. Re-
markably, the bound can be computed considering only
two-qubit density operators σAB [26]:
r ≥ inf
σAB∈ΓQ,V
S(A|E)−H(A|B)
= inf
σAB∈ΓQ,V
1− S(σAB) (A2)
where S is the Von Neumann entropy, H is the Shan-
non entropy, and the second line is obtained when Eve
holds a purification of σAB which is a usual assumption
in quantum cryptography. The set ΓQ,V is the set of two-
qubit Bell-diagonal density operators which are compat-
ible with the measured QBER Q and visibility V . Our
goal is to characterize this set, and then to perform the
minimization in Eq. (A2). This is done by using the
entanglement-based description of the three-state proto-
col, and considering the most general attack that Eve can
perform on a qubit that goes from Alice to Bob.
b. Qubit pairs shared by Alice and Bob
Let us first consider the equivalent entanglement-based
version of the three-state protocol: Alice prepares the
state
|ΨAB〉 =
√
1− f |Φ+〉AB +
√
f |D〉A|+ x〉B (A3)
where we used the standard notation |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 +
|11〉), and where |D〉A is a state orthogonal to |0〉A and
|1〉A (Alice’s system is therefore 3-dimensional); she keeps
the first system and sends the second one to Bob.
On her system, Alice performs a projective measure-
ment in order to prepare Bob’s state. When Alice gets
the result |0〉A (which she does with probability 1−f2 ),
she prepares the state |0〉B for Bob; when she gets |1〉A
(with probability 1−f2 ), she prepares the state |1〉B for
Bob; finally, when she gets |D〉A (with probability f),
she prepares a decoy sequence |+ x〉B for Bob.
The system B that goes from Alice to Bob through
the quantum channel can be attacked by Eve. Let us
describe her action by a super operator E = {Ej}. The
state shared by Alice and Bob after the transmission of
system B is then
ρAB = E(|ΨAB〉〈ΨAB|)
=
∑
j
1A ⊗ Ej |ΨAB〉〈ΨAB|1A ⊗ E†j . (A4)
After the public communication, Alice and Bob know
which systems led to bits of the key (when Alice ob-
tained either |0〉A or |1〉A and Bob measured in the Z
basis), and which systems came from decoy sequences
(when Alice obtained |D〉A and Bob measured in the X
basis). They have 2 sets of systems in the states :
ρbitAB = (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)A ρAB (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|)A
= (1− f)
∑
j
1A ⊗ Ej |Φ+AB〉〈Φ+AB |1A ⊗ E†j (A5)
ρdecoyAB = |D〉〈D|A ρAB |D〉〈D|A
= f
∑
j
1A ⊗ Ej |D,+x〉AB〈D,+x| 1A ⊗ E†j . (A6)
We shall write ρ = ρ˜bitAB =
1
1−f ρ
bit
AB and ρ˜
decoy
AB =
1
f ρ
decoy
AB the corresponding normalized states. Note that√
2|D〉〈+x|A ⊗ 1B |Φ+AB〉 = |D〉A|+ x〉B and therefore
ρ˜decoyAB = 2|D〉〈+x| ⊗ 1 ρ˜bitAB |+ x〉〈D| ⊗ 1 .
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c. Characterizing the set ΓQ,V
The set ΓQ,V contains any state of the form
σAB = λ1PΦ+ + λ2PΦ− + λ3PΨ+ + λ4PΨ− (A7)
where we use the notation PΦ = |Φ〉〈Φ| for any state |Φ〉,
where the |Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉 are the Bell states, and where
λ1 = 〈Φ+| ρ |Φ+〉, λ2 = 〈Φ−| ρ |Φ−〉
λ3 = 〈Ψ+| ρ |Ψ+〉, λ4 = 〈Ψ−| ρ |Ψ−〉 . (A8)
The first constraint is the definition of the QBER, the
same for all protocols, namely
Q = λ3 + λ4. (A9)
The constraint that defines V is typical of this protocol.
To derive it, we use the fact that the probability for decoy
sequences to be detected correctly by Bob is 1+V2 :
1± V
2
= 〈D| ⊗ 〈±x| ρ˜decoyAB |D〉 ⊗ | ± x〉
= 2 〈+x,±x|ρ|+ x,±x〉 . (A10)
Since |+ x,+x〉 = 1√
2
(|Φ+〉+ |Ψ+〉), then
1 + V
2
= (〈Φ+|+ 〈Ψ+|)ρ(|Φ+〉+ |Ψ+〉)
= λ1 + λ3 + (〈Φ+| ρ |Ψ+〉+ c.c.) . (A11)
The Cauchy-Schwartz inequality implies |〈Φ+| ρ |Ψ+〉| ≤√
λ1λ3, and therefore |〈Φ+| ρ |Ψ+〉 + 〈Ψ+| ρ |Φ+〉| ≤
2
√
λ1λ3. We finally obtain the following constraint:
(
√
λ1 −
√
λ3)
2 ≤ 1 + V
2
≤ (
√
λ1 +
√
λ3)
2 . (A12)
Similarly, starting from 1−V2 , one obtains
(
√
λ2 −
√
λ4)
2 ≤ 1− V
2
≤ (
√
λ2 +
√
λ4)
2 . (A13)
For a state σAB to be in the set ΓQ,V , its coeffi-
cients λs therefore have to satisfy the constraints (A9),
(A12) and (A13), along with the normalization condition
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 1.
d. Lower bound on the secret key rate
Now we have to compute the bound (A2). One
can show that, given our constraints, the infimum of
1− S(σAB) is obtained when
√
λ1 +
√
λ3 =
√
1 + V
2
(A14)
√
λ2 −
√
λ4 =
√
1− V
2
(A15)
These equalities, together with Eq. (A9) and the nor-
malization condition, allow an analytical expression of
the lower bound:
r(Q, V ) ≥ 1−H ([λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4]) (A16)
with
λ1 = (1−Q)
[
1+V
2 −QV −
√
(1 − V 2)Q(1−Q)
]
,
λ2 = (1−Q)
[
1−V
2 +QV +
√
(1− V 2)Q(1−Q)
]
,
λ3 = Q
[
1−V
2 +QV +
√
(1− V 2)Q(1−Q)
]
,
λ4 = Q
[
1+V
2 −QV −
√
(1− V 2)Q(1−Q)
]
.
The results are plotted in Fig. 3. For all values of the pa-
rameters, the rates we find are equal or better than those
found by Fung and Lo [25]: in particular, for V = 1 we
find security up to Q ≈ 11%, while they reach only up to
Q <∼ 7.57% (see Fig. 2 of Ref. [25], where α ≡ 1−V2 and
eb ≡ Q).
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FIG. 3. Security study of the three-state protocol in a sin-
gle-photon implementation. Upper graph: lower bound r as
a function of Q and V ; lower graph: projection of the upper
graph on the (Q,V ) plane, showing the region of parameters
in which the protocol is provably secure.
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e. Special cases Q = 0, V = 1
Let’s study the particular cases Q = 0 and V = 1.
With the previous analysis, we find
R(Q = 0, V ) ≥ 1− h
(
1− V
2
)
, (A17)
R(Q, V = 1) ≥ 1− 2h(Q) (A18)
where h is binary entropy. In particular, the second rate
is the same as the one obtained for the BB84 protocol
[7].
In these limiting cases, we have been able to com-
pute a lower bound in a different way, namely using
the Devetak-Winter bound for collective attacks [27] and
then invoking a de Finetti theorem to extend the result
to all possible attacks [8]. For the case Q = 0, we find
exactly the same result; for the case V = 1 however, the
lower bound calculated in this new way is slightly better.
This is not a contradiction, as the method of Ref. [9] is
not claimed to provide tight bounds in all circumstances.
2. Weak Coherent Pulses
a. Conservative lower bound
In our three-state protocol, exactly as it happens for
BB84, as soon as a pulse contains two photons, Eve can
obtain full information using the PNS attack. There-
fore, all the pulses containing more than one photon are
”tagged”: it is as if they would carry a label which reveals
the quantum state. Once one has a lower bound r in a
single-photon implementation, a lower bound for imple-
mentations with weak coherent pulses can be computed
using the techniques developed in Ref. [11].
Let ∆ be the fraction of tagged signals: on these,
Eve has full information thanks to the tag. Eve’s best
strategy consists in introducing no error on the tagged
pulses, and a larger error Q1 =
Q
1−∆ on the untagged
ones, so that the total QBER is still Q. A similar rea-
soning holds for V : in Eve’s best strategy, the tagged
pulses have V = 1, therefore the single photon pulses
have V1 =
V−∆
1−∆ . These estimates have a bearing on pri-
vacy amplification, while error correction must be done
for the average Q. The achievable secret key rate is fi-
nally bounded as
r ≥ [(1−∆)S (Q1, V1)− h(Q)] (A19)
where S(Q, V ) = r(Q, V ) − h(Q) and r(Q, V ) is the
single-photon lower bound of Eq. (A16). Finally, it is
easy to compute the optimum value of ∆. In general, ∆
is the probability that Alice sends more than one pho-
ton, conditioned to the fact that Bob has received some-
thing. Clearly, the best case for Eve is that Bob always
receives something when Alice has sent two or more pho-
tons. Therefore
∆ =
1− e−µ − µe−µ
1− e−µtη ≈
µ
2tη
. (A20)
Knowing this, one can now multiply r by Bob’s detec-
tion rate to obtain the secret key rate in bits per pair of
pulses, then optimize µ to maximize this quantity. Note
that the lower bound (A19) is very conservative because
it holds only for the untrusted-device scenario — this is
why the denominator in (A20) contains η as well; it is
not known how to prove a rigorous lower bound in the
trusted-device scenario. (See also [28]).
b. PNS attack in the zero-error case
In the main text, we have presented zero-error attacks
against the COW protocol in the trusted-device scenario.
For comparison, we compute the PNS attack against
the three-state protocol implemented with weak coher-
ent pulses: we recall that in this protocol, contrary to
COW, there is no coherence across the bit separation.
If Q = 0 and V = 1, we have I(A : B) = 1. Eve counts
the number of photons in each two-pulse sequence cor-
responding to a bit: if she finds n = 1, she can either
let the photon go or block it, but in any case she can’t
learn anything; if she finds n > 1, she keeps some pho-
tons and sends the others to Bob, and she has full in-
formation. For the purpose of this simple analysis, we
write everything in the case µ≪ 1 (the generalization is
straightforward but complicates the formulae). We have
then I(A : E) = µ2t , the difference with (A20) coming
from the fact that we can compute this upper bound in
the trusted-device scenario. The rate per bit becomes
R =
(
1− µ
2t
)
µ t tBη(1 − f) . (A21)
This expression is optimal for µopt = t, therefore
R(µopt) ≈ t
2
2
tBη(1− f) . (A22)
This scales as t2, as it happens for BB84 under the same
conditions [29]. This rate is much smaller than the upper
bounds obtained in the main text for the COW proto-
col for the most powerful attacks described in this paper
(Fig. 2). A better attack may exist against COW; how-
ever, we conjecture that this difference is intrinsic — in
physical terms, we conjecture that the existence of co-
herence across the bit separation is a real advantage and
increases the extractable secret key rates by a significant
amount.
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APPENDIX B: BEAM-SPLITTING ATTACK
AND DEVETAK-WINTER BOUND
The beam-splitting attack is the only known attack
which will simulate exactly all statistics for Alice and
Bob given a lossy channel, since it is a physical model for
such a lossy channel. The fraction 1−t of lost photons are
given to Eve, who has forwarded the remaining fraction t
to Bob through a lossless channel. The information that
Eve can extract from her data depends on the way she
processes them. For each bit she wants to estimate, Eve
faces the problem of distinguishing the two states |0α′〉
and |α′0〉, where α′ = √1− t α.
In Refs [4,5], it was supposed that Eve performed the
same measurement as Bob: she measures the time of ar-
rival for each pulse, which corresponds to the best unam-
biguous state discrimination between the two states |0α′〉
and |α′0〉. With probability 1 − 〈0α′|α′0〉, the result is
conclusive and she gets full information on the bit. Her
average information on each bit is then
IUSD = 1− 〈0α′|α′0〉 . (B1)
However, there are other measurements that could give
Eve more information. For instance, the minimum-error
measurement [30] would give her the information
IME = 1− h
(
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 〈0α′|α′0〉2
)
, (B2)
which is larger than IUSD (h is the binary entropy func-
tion).
The USD and ME measurements are bitwise measure-
ments, and define the so-called individual (or incoherent)
attacks. More generally, Eve can be allowed to make a
collective attack from beam-splitting: each signal is split
with the same fraction, as above, but then Eve is al-
lowed to wait until the end of classical post-processing
(error correction, privacy amplification) before perform-
ing a (possibly coherent) measurement on the quantum
systems she has kept. What Eve does maybe hard to
find (actually, to our knowledge, this is not known for
any protocol); but a computable bound for the secret
key rate that can be extracted in the presence of collec-
tive attacks has nevertheless be found by Devetak and
Winter [27]. The upper bound on the accessible infor-
mation that Eve can learn, whatever the measurement
she performs, is given by the Holevo bound [31]. For the
problem of distinguishing the two states |0α′〉 and |α′0〉,
the Holevo bound is [32]
χHol = h
(
1− 〈0α′|α′0〉
2
)
. (B3)
The Devetak-Winter bound for the secret key rate reads
then
R ≥ (1− f) (1− e−µttBη) (1− χHol) (B4)
>∼ (1− f)µttBη
[
1− h
(1− e−µ(1−t)
2
)]
(B5)
the second expression being for the case µttBη ≪ 1.
As usual, Alice and Bob should choose µ in order to
optimize R. Let’s define g(x) = x
[
1 − h(1−e−x2 )
]
. Nu-
merically, we find supx g(x) ≡ g(ξ) ≈ 0.1428, obtained
for ξ ≈ 0.4583. Therefore, the optimal value of µ in the
case of a collective beam-splitting attack is
µopt =
ξ
1− t (B6)
and the corresponding lower bound on the extractable
secret key rate is
R(µopt) = g(ξ)
t
1− t tBη(1− f) . (B7)
This is what we plotted in Figs 2 and 4 in comparison to
our attacks.
APPENDIX C: ON THE ATTACK THAT
REPRODUCES THE DETECTION RATES
We give here the calculation of (q0, q1, q2, q3) that de-
fine the attack that reproduces the detection rates stud-
ied in Section IV, and comment on some of its features.
We recall that we work in the limit µtη ≪ 1 and that we
suppose that Eve sends one photon to Bob when she has
got a conclusive result.
1. Calculation of the parameters (q0, q1, q2, q3) of the
attack
For DB,bit and DB,decoy, the requirement (33) leads
respectively to the following two conditions:
µ(t− q0) =
2
3 q1 p
0α0
concl +
1
2 q2 p
0α:α0
concl
1− f , (C1)
µ(t− q0) = q3 p
0:αα:0
concl
4f
. (C2)
Given these two conditions, the requirement (33) is au-
tomatically satisfied for DMj,2k for both j = 1, 2. This
is not astonishing, as these detection rates depend on
f in the same way as those of DB do. Finally, for the
DMj,2k+1, the requirement (33) gives two new conditions:
µ(t− q0) =
4
3 q1 p
0α0
concl + 2q2 p
0α:α0
concl + q3 p
0:αα:0
concl
(1 + f)(3 + f)
,
µ(t− q0) =
4
3 q1 p
0α0
concl + q3 p
0:αα:0
concl
1− f2 .
It can be checked that one of these conditions is redun-
dant, as it follows exactly from assuming the other one
together with (C1) and (C2); as a third condition, we
12
take then a simple linear combination of the last two
ones, which reads
µ(t− q0) = q2 p
0α:α0
concl
(1 + f)2
. (C3)
In summary, we have four linear conditions [(C1), (C2),
(C3) and the normalization (32)] for the four coefficients
qj : the system can be solved exactly as a function of µ,
t and f .
The solution — whose result is given in the main text,
Eqs (34)–(38) — goes as follows. For j = 1, 2, 3, we
have qj = µ(t − q0)Fj where F2 can be read directly in
Eq. (C3), F3 in Eq. (C2), and F1 = 3(1−4f−f2)/4p0α0concl
can be derived from those and from Eq. (C1). The nor-
malization condition (32) gives then q0 =
µtF−1
µF−1 with
F = F1 + F2 + F3.
We must still verify that q0 is a probability. Since
t < 1, the condition q0 ≤ 1 is satisfied provided µF > 1,
which is true for all values of µ and f (in fact, it can
be verified that the minimal value of µF , obtained for
µ ≈ 2, is of the order 100, slightly dependent on f).
Given µF > 1, the condition q0 ≥ 0 is satisfied provided
µtF ≥ 1. To fulfill this condition, one must know how µ
varies with t. Let’s consider first µopt as defined in (45):
then µtF = 3(1 − t), therefore the condition is satisfied
for t ≤ 23 or (with the parameters used for the graphs)
ℓ >∼ 7km — in practice, recall that (45) is valid for µ≪ 1
that is for t ≪ 1; so the result is consistent. If we take
now µmax =
√
3µopt, we find µtF = 1− t: the condition
can never be satisfied. This is not really a problem: it
simply means that Eve must add some losses, i.e. that
we must add to her strategy the possibility of blocking
pulses.
2. Behavior of q1, q2, q3
In general, it holds F3 > F2 > F1, that is, q3 > q2 > q1,
for all values of f and µ. The fact that q3 does not van-
ish (and remains even larger than q1 and q2) if f ≡ 0
is an artefact of the solution of the system. In fact, the
requirement on DB,decoy reads originally 4f µ(t − q0) =
q3 p
0:αα:0
concl : if f > 0, it gives (C2) as we stated it; but if
f = 0, the requirement is automatically satisfied and no
constraint is put on q3 (the best choice for Eve would
then be q3 = 0). In any case, COW without decoy se-
quences would be much more vulnerable against Eve’s
attacks [4,5], so the case f ≡ 0 is not of real interest. A
more meaningful question is, what happens in the limit
f → 0 for real implementations (blurred statistics, finite
key length); but, as already mentioned, we haven’t de-
veloped the mathematical tools yet, which would allow
to tackle this problem.
APPENDIX D: THE CONSEQUENCE OF POOR
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE
Let us suppose that Alice and Bob verify Q = 0, V = 1
(without distinguishing decoy sequences from 1 − 0 bit
sequences) and just the average detection rate DtB. In
particular, they don’t check that the fraction of decoy
sequences is the expected one: Eve can set q3 = 0. As
simple examples of the attacks that become possible, Eve
can always attack with USD3 (q2 = 0) or with USD4a
(q1 = 0).
USD3 attack. If q2 = q3 = 0 and only the detection
rate in DB is monitored, the set of requirements (33) re-
duce to the sole condition q1D
(3)
B + (1 − q1)Dt=1B = DtB
i.e.
q1 =
Dt=1B −DtB
Dt=1B −D(3)B
. (D1)
The secret key rate that can be extracted against such
an attack is
R = (1− q1)Dt=1B,bit =
(
DtB −D(3)B
Dt=1B −D(3)B
)
Dt=1B,bit . (D2)
The values of µmax, µopt and R(µopt) can now be com-
puted as a function of t. Numerical solutions are plotted
in Fig. 4, as a function of the distance. We have plotted
two series of curves for our attack (describing the cases
where Eve forwards either one photon or bright pulses)
against the curve associated to the BS attack. Ana-
lytical solutions can be obtained in the limit µ << 1:
µmax = Ct, µopt = Ct/2 and R(µopt) =
1−f
4 tBη Ct
2
with C = [6(1 + f)tBη]/[(1 − f)2Π(tBη)]. Note that
R(µopt) ∝ t2, whereas for the attack that preserves
the detection rates we had the much slower decrease
R(µopt) ∝ t3/2 [Eq. (46)].
USD4a attack. The analysis of the case q1 = q3 = 0
follows exactly the same pattern, just replacingD
(3)
B with
D
(4)
B — in fact, the only difference is the factor
4
3 which
relates these two quantities, see Eqs (13) and (18). This
attacks gives slightly better rates than those plotted in
Fig. 4; in the case µ << 1, the analytical solutions for
µmax, µopt and R(µopt) are the same as before, with now
C = [8(1 + f)tBη]/[(1− f)2Π(tBη)].
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FIG. 4. USD3 attack, which becomes possible if Alice and
Bob check only the average detection rate. We plot the op-
timal mean photon number µopt (upper graph) and corre-
sponding secret key rate R (lower graph) as a function of the
distance d. Full lines: results for Π(tBη) = tBη (Eve forwards
one photon); dashed lines: results for Π(tBη) = 1 (Eve for-
wards bright pulses). The attack is again compared to the
Holevo bound on the BS attack (Appendix B). The parame-
ters are the same as in Fig. 2.
The message of Fig. 4 is clear: these attacks are sig-
nificantly more powerful than the one in which Eve is
asked to reproduce all the detection rates (Fig. 2). In
particular, the distance ℓ, at which the attacks become
important, is approximately 50km, well within the actual
experimental working range. To avoid these attacks, it
is therefore mandatory that Bob checks carefully his de-
tection rates.
APPENDIX E: USD ATTACKS IN THE CASE OF
”EMPTY DECOY SEQUENCES”
In this Appendix, we study a modification of the COW
protocol, which makes it more robust against the attacks
known to date (in particular, against the attacks studied
in this paper), while keeping the simplicity at the exper-
imental level. The modification consists in introducing
a new type of decoy sequence, which is just two empty
pulses. In this modified COW, Alice sends an ”empty
decoy sequence” |00〉 with probability f0, and a ”full de-
coy sequence” |αα〉 with probability f1. We will write
f = f0 + f1. With probability
1−f
2 , Alice sends a logical
bit 0 (resp. 1).
It may be at first sight astonishing, that additional
vacuum signals may provide an advantage; still, this hap-
pens also in decoy state protocols [33]. In our case, the
possibility of new signals (albeit empty ones) makes the
unambiguous state discrimination that we have studied
in Section III less efficient, because the set of possible
states becomes larger.
1. Attack on 3 pulses
Eve wants to discriminate the state |0α0〉 from the
seven other possible states, which are now:
|000〉 , |00α〉 , |0αα〉 , |α00〉 , |α0α〉 , |αα0〉 , |ααα〉 .
(E1)
Note that the previous state |ψ0α0〉 [Eq. (11)] is not or-
thogonal to |000〉. Instead, the state orthogonal to the
seven states listed in (E1) is
|ψ0α0〉 = φ(α) − χφ(0)√
1− χ2 (E2)
where φ is given by Eq. (25). As before, Eve performs a
projective measurement which separates |ψ0α0〉 from the
subspace orthogonal to it. Conditioned on the fact that
the state |0α0〉 was sent by Alice, the probability of a con-
clusive result is |〈0α0|ψ0α0〉|2 = (1 − χ2)3 = (1 − e−µ)3.
This is smaller than the value (1 − e−µ)2 found in the
absence of empty decoy sequences.
2. Attack on 4 pulses
Eve wants to discriminate the state |0αα0〉 from the
fifteen other possible states, which are now:
|0000〉, |000α〉, |00α0〉, |00αα〉, |0α00〉,
|0α0α〉, |0ααα〉, |α000〉, |α00α〉, |α0α0〉,
|α0αα〉, |αα00〉, |αα0α〉, |ααα0〉, |αααα〉.
(E3)
Note that the analysis is the same for attacks USD4a and
USD4b here, since all the sequences are possible.
The state orthogonal to these fifteen states is
|ψ0αα0〉 = φ(αα) − χφ(0α) − χφ(α0) + χ
2φ(αα)
1− χ2 . (E4)
Conditioned on the fact that the state |0αα0〉 was
sent by Alice, the probability of a conclusive result is
|〈0αα0|ψ0αα0〉|2 = (1 − χ2)4. Again, the probability of
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success is smaller than the probability of success (1−χ
2)3
1+χ2
for the USD4b attack, and much smaller than the one
(1 − χ2)2 for the USD4a attack in the absence of empty
decoy sequences.
3. Attack that preserves the detection rates
The study follows exactly the same lines as for the at-
tack studied in Section IV and Appendix C. As we did
there, we suppose that Eve performs one of the three
USD attacks with probabilities qj , or forwards the pulses
through a lossless channel with probability q0. The prob-
abilities for each USD attack to be conclusive are the
following :
p0α0concl =
1− f
2
(
1− f
2
+ f0
)
(1− e−µ)3 , (E5)
p0α:α0concl =
(
1− f
2
)2
(1− e−µ)4 , (E6)
p0:αα:0concl = f1
(
1− f
2
+ f0
)2
(1− e−µ)4 . (E7)
Under the assumption that Eve forwards one photon
when her attack is conclusive, and in the regime where
µη ≪ 1, one finds qj = µ(t − q0)Fj for j = 1, 2, 3, and
q0 =
µtF−1
µF−1 , with now:
F1 =
3(1− 4f1 − (f1 − f0)2)
4p0α0concl
(E8)
F2 =
(1− f0 + f1)2
p0α:α0concl
(E9)
F3 =
4f1
p0:αα:0concl
(E10)
F = F1 + F2 + F3 . (E11)
Apart from the obvious restriction f0 + f1 ≤ 1, since
F1 has to be positive there is a restriction on the val-
ues of f0 and f1 for this attack to be possible: f1 ≤
min
(
1/4,−2 + f0 +
√
5− 4f0
)
.
The upper bound on the extractable secret key rate is
R(µ) = q0D
t=1
B,bit = q0µtBη(1 − f) . (E12)
In the limit µ ≪ 1, the optimization of R can be done
analytically, using F (µ) ≈ 4Fµ4 with F = (1+f1−f0)
2
(1−f1−f0)2 +
4
(1−f1+f0)2 and q0 ≈ t −
µ3
4F . In order to optimize R,
Alice and Bob will choose
µopt ≈ F1/3 t1/3 (E13)
and obtain the rate
R(µopt) ≈ 3F
1/3
4
tBη(1− f) t4/3 . (E14)
Note that now, µopt ∝ t1/3 and R(µopt) ∝ t4/3: the
new protocol with empty decoy sequences is more ro-
bust against our USD attacks. Besides, one gets µmax =
41/3µopt.
In general, the optimization of R over µ must be done
numerically. We show the results in Fig. 5 for the same
parameters as we used for Fig. 2, but here f = 0.1 is
split into f0 = f1 = 0.05. We see that, in the presence
of empty decoy sequences, the USD attack that repro-
duces all rates overcomes the beam-splitting attack only
for ℓ >∼ 120km.
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FIG. 5. USD attack that reproduces the detection rates, on
the COW protocol, with and without empty decoy sequences,
compared to the Holevo bound on the BS attack. Same pa-
rameters as in Fig. 2, and f0 = f1 = 0.05.
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